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Abstract In an -Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most  by changing
his behaviour. Recent work has addressed the question of how best to com-
pute -Nash equilibria, and for what values of  a polynomial-time algorithm
exists. An -well-supported Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) has the additional re-
quirement that any strategy that is used with non-zero probability by a player
must have payoff at most  less than a best response. A recent algorithm of
Kontogiannis and Spirakis shows how to compute a 2/3-WSNE in polynomial
time, for bimatrix games. Here we introduce a new technique that leads to an
improvement to the worst-case approximation guarantee.
1 Introduction
In a bimatrix game, a Nash equilibrium is a pair of strategies in which the
two players only assign probability to best response strategies. The apparent
hardness of computing an exact Nash equilibrium [5,3] has led to work on
computing approximate Nash equilibria, and two notions of approximate Nash
equilibria have been developed. The first, and more widely studied, notion is of
an -approximate Nash equilibrium (-Nash), where each player is required to
achieve an expected payoff that is within  of a best response. A line of work [7,
6,2] has investigated the value of  that can be guaranteed in polynomial time.
The current best result in this setting is a polynomial time algorithm that
always finds a 0.3393-Nash equilibrium [13].
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However, -Nash equilibria have a drawback: since they only require that
the expected payoff is within  of a pure best response, it is possible that a
player could be required to place probability on a strategy that is arbitrarily
far from being a best response. This issue is addressed by the second notion
of an approximate Nash equilibrium. An -well supported approximate Nash
equilibrium (-WSNE), requires that both players only place probability on
strategies that have payoff within  of a pure best response. This is a stronger
notion of equilibrium, because every -WSNE is an -Nash, but the converse
is not true.
In contrast to -Nash, there has been relatively little work -WSNE. The
first result on the subject gave a 56 additive approximation [7], but this only
holds if a certain a graph-theoretic conjecture is true. The best-known polynomial-
time additive approximation algorithm was given by Kontogiannis and Spi-
rakis, and achieves a 23 -approximation [11]. We will call this algorithm the KS
algorithm. In [10], which is an earlier conference version of [11], the authors
presented an algorithm that they claimed was polynomial-time and achieves
a φ-WSNE, where φ =
√
11
2 − 1 ≈ 0.6583, but this was later withdrawn, and
instead the polynomial-time 23 -approximation algorithm was presented in [11].
Recently, it has been shown that for every δ > 0, a (12 + δ)-WSNE can be
found in polynomial times for symmetric bimatrix games [4]. It has also been
shown that there is a PTAS for -WSNE if and only if there is a PTAS for
-Nash [3, Lemma 3.2].
Our contribution In this paper, we develop an algorithm for finding an -
WSNE with  < 23 . Our approach to modifying the KS algorithm for finding
a 23 -WSNE, by adding two additional procedures: we perform a brute-force
search that finds the best WSNE with a 2× 2 support, and we attempt to im-
prove the -WSNE returned by the KS algorithm by shifting the probabilities
of the two players. We show that one of these two approaches will always find
an -WSNE with  = 23 − 0.005913759. Our results are particularly interesting
when compared to a recent support size lower bound of Anbalagan, Norin,
Savani, and Vetta, who showed that there exist games in which all -WSNE
with  < 23 have super-constant sized supports [1].
A preliminary version of this paper was published in the proceedings of
SAGT 2012 [8]. In that version of the paper, we gave a polynomial time algo-
rithm for finding an -WSNE with  = 23 − 0.004735. It turns out that one of
the inequalities used to show this result1 was not as strong as it could have
been, and correcting this led to the improved bound in this version of the pa-
per. We have also greatly simplified the computer-assisted proof that is used
at the end of the paper. The preliminary version of the paper used a rather
opaque method involving sensitivity analysis of a linear program. We have
reformulated the LP so that the relevant values can be read directly from the
solution of the LP. The algorithm has since been implemented as part of an
experimental study [9].
1 The inequality in question appeared in Proposition 16 of the preliminary version, and
is now part of Proposition 12.
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The paper will proceed as follows. In Section 2 we give the basic definitions
that will be needed in this paper. In Section 3 we give a high level overview
of our algorithms, along with the intuition behind our two modifications. In
Section 4, we formally define our algorithm and state our main theorem. In
Section 5 we give a high level overview of the proof, before then proceeding
with the proof in Sections 6 through 9.
2 Definitions
A bimatrix game is a pair (R,C) of two n × n matrices: R gives payoffs for
the row player, and C gives payoffs for the column player. We assume that
all payoffs are in the range [0, 1]. We use [n] = {1, 2, . . . n} to denote the pure
strategies for each player. To play the game, both players simultaneously select
a pure strategy: the row player selects a row i ∈ [n], and the column player
selects a column j ∈ [n]. The row player then receives Ri,j , and the column
player receives Ci,j .
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over [n]. We denote a mixed
strategy as a vector x of length n, such that xi is the probability that the pure
strategy i is played. The support of mixed strategy x, denoted Supp(x), is the
set of pure strategies i with xi > 0. If x and y are mixed strategies for the row
and column player, respectively, then we call (x,y) a mixed strategy profile.
Let y be a mixed strategy for the column player. The best responses against
y for the row player is the set of pure strategies that maximize the payoff
against y. More formally, a pure strategy i ∈ [n] is a best response against
y if, for all pure strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have: ∑j∈[n] yj · Ri,j ≥ ∑j∈[n] yj ·
Ri′,j . Column player best responses are defined analogously. A mixed strategy
profile (x,y) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if every pure strategy in Supp(x)
is a best response against y, and every pure strategy in Supp(y) is a best
response against x. Nash [12] showed that all bimatrix games have a mixed
Nash equilibrium.
An approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium weakens the requirements
of a mixed Nash equilibrium. For a mixed strategy y of the column player, a
pure strategy i ∈ [n] is an -best response for the row player if, for all pure
strategies i′ ∈ [n] we have: ∑j∈[n] yj · Ri,j ≥ ∑j∈[n] yj · Ri′,j − . We define
-best responses for the column player analogously. A mixed strategy profile
(x,y) is an -well-supported Nash equilibrium (-WSNE) if every pure strategy
in Supp(x) is an -best response against y, and every pure strategy in Supp(y)
is an -best response against x.
3 Outline
Before we give a technical presentation of our algorithm, we begin by giving
the high level ideas behind our techniques. Our approach builds upon the
algorithm of Kontogiannis and Spirakis for finding a 23 -WSNE, so let us begin
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Fig. 1: The left figure shows a worst case example for the KS algorithm. The
right figure shows the corresponding zero-sum game (D,−D).
by describing their algorithm. Given a bimatrix game (R,C), the KS algorithm
performs two steps:
1. Check if there is a pure strategy profile under which both players get payoff
at least 13 . If so, that pure strategy profile is a
2
3 -WSNE.
2. Construct the zero-sum game (D,−D) where D = 12 (R−C), and let (x,y)
be a Nash-equilibrium of (D,−D).
Kontogiannis and Spirakis showed that if step 1 failed to find a pure 23 -WSNE
of (R,C), then (x,y) is a 23 -WSNE of (R,C). Our goal is to show that the
WSNEs found by the KS algorithm can be improved: either by shifting prob-
abilities, or by finding a matching pennies sub-game. We now show the moti-
vation behind these two procedures.
Shifting probabilities Figure 1a shows an example for which the KS al-
gorithm actually produces a 23 -WSNE. For simplicity of exposition, we have
ignored the first part of the algorithm here: note that in (T, `) and (T, r) both
players have payoff greater than or equal to 13 . If we replace both
1
3 payoffs
with 13 − δ, for some arbitrarily small δ > 0, then this issue is avoided, and the
properties of the example do not significantly change.
Figure 1b shows the corresponding zero-sum game. Let (x,y) be a strategy
profile in which the row player plays B, and the column player mixes equally
between ` and r. Observe that (x,y) is a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum
game, and that it is 23 -WSNE of (R,C), and no better. Therefore, this example
is a worst-case example for the KS-algorithm.
Our observation is that (x,y) can be improved by shifting probabilities.
We can improve things for the row player by transferring some of the column
player’s probability from r to `. This reduces the payoff of T while leaving the
payoff of B unchanged. Thus, B becomes an -best response for  < 23 , and we
obtain a better WSNE.
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Fig. 2: The left figure shows an example for which the approach of shifting
probabilities fails. The right figure shows the corresponding zero-sum game.
Matching pennies Figure 2 shows a game in which the approach of shifting
probabilities does not work. To see this, observe that the strategy profile (x,y)
where the row player plays B, and the column player mixes uniformly over
` and r is a Nash equilibrium of the game shown in Figure 2b. When (x,y)
is played in the original game in Figure 2a, this gives a 23 -WSNE and no
better. However, in this case, the column player cannot make the row player
happier by shifting probabilities: if probability is shifted to `, then the payoff
of strategy T will increase, and if probability is shifted to r then the payoff of
strategy M will increase.
In this case, we use a different approach. We observe that the 2×2 subgame
induced by `, r, T , and M , is similar to a matching pennies game. If the row
player mixes uniformly overM and T , while the column player mixes uniformly
of ` and r, then both players will obtain payoff at least 0.5, which yields a 0.5-
WSNE.
Our approach We will show that one of these two techniques can always be
applied. Our algorithm will first perform a brute force search over all 2×2 sub-
games in order to determine whether there is a matching pennies sub game.
If such a game is not found, then we run the KS algorithm and attempt to
shift probabilities in the resulting strategy profile. Ultimately, we show that
this algorithm always produces a ( 23 − 0.005913759)-WSNE.
4 Our Algorithm
In this section we formally describe our algorithm for finding a WSNE. We
begin by describing a method for finding the best WSNE on a given pair of
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supports, and then move on to describe the three procedures that make up
our algorithm.
The best WSNE on a pair of supports Let Sc and Sr be supports for
the column and row player, respectively. We first define an LP, which assumes
that the row player uses a strategy with support Sr, and then finds a strategy
on Sc that minimizes the difference between the row player’s best response
payoff, and the payoff of the strategies in Sr.
Definition 1 For each Sr, Sc ⊆ [n], we define BestR(Sr, Sc) to be the follow-
ing linear program with variables  ∈ R and y ∈ Rn:
Minimize: 
Subject to: Ri′ · y −Ri · y ≤  i ∈ Sr, i′ ∈ [n] (1)
yj = 0 j /∈ Sc
yj ≥ 0 j ∈ [n]∑
j∈[n]
yj = 1
Similarly, the following LP assumes that the column player uses a strategy with
support Sc, and finds a strategy on Sr that minimizes the difference between
the column player’s best response payoff, and the payoff of the strategies in
Sc.
Definition 2 For each Sr, Sc ⊆ [n], we define BestC(Sr, Sc) to be the follow-
ing linear program with variables  ∈ R and x ∈ Rn:
Minimize: 
Subject to: CTj′ · x− CTj · x ≤  j ∈ Sc, j′ ∈ [n] (2)
xi = 0 i /∈ Sr
xi ≥ 0 i ∈ [n]∑
j∈[n]
xi = 1
We now prove that these two LPs give a WSNE that is at least as good
as the best WSNE on the supports Sr and Sc. Let (y
∗, y) be a solution of
BestR(Sr, Sc), let (x
∗, x) be a solution of BestC(Sr, Sc), and let ∗ to be
max(x, y).
Proposition 3 We have:
1. (x∗,y∗) is an ∗-WSNE.
2. For every -WSNE (x,y) with Supp(x) = Sr and Supp(y) = Sc, we have
∗ ≤ .
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Proof The first claim is straightforward, because Constraint 1 ensures that
every strategy i ∈ Supp(x∗) ⊆ Sr is an y-best response against y∗, and
every strategy j ∈ Supp(y∗) ⊆ Sc is an x-best response against x∗. Therefore
(x∗,y∗) is a ∗-WSNE.
For the second claim, let (x,y) be an -WSNE on the supports Sr and Sc.
Since every row i ∈ Supp(x) = Sr is an -best response against y, we must
have that y and  are feasible in BestR(Sr, Sc). For the same reason, we have
that x and  are feasible in BestC(Sr, Sc). Therefore, we must have 
∗ ≤ .
Proposition 3 implies that (x∗,y∗) is at least as good as the best WSNE
on the supports Sr and Sc. Note that it is possible that (x
∗,y∗) may actually
be better than any WSNE on these supports, because the LPs do not require
that x∗ places probability on all strategies in Sr, or that y∗ places probability
on all strategies in Sc.
Our Algorithm We now describe our algorithm for finding a WSNE in a
bimatrix game. Our algorithm for finding a WSNE consists of three distinct
procedures.
– Procedure 1: find the best pure WSNE. The KS algorithm requires a
preprocessing step that eliminates all games that have a pure 23 -WSNE, and
this is a generalisation of that step. Suppose that the row player plays row
i, and that the column player plays column j. Let: r = maxi′(Ri′,j)−Ri,j ,
and c = maxj′(Ci,j′) − Ci,j . Thus i is an r-best response against j, and
that j is an c-best response against i. Therefore, (i, j) is a max(r, c)-
WSNE. We can find the best pure WSNE by checking all O(n2) possible
pairs of pure strategies. Let p be the best approximation guarantee that
is found by this procedure.
– Procedure 2: find the best WSNE with 2× 2 support. We can use
the linear programs from Definitions 1 and 2 to implement this procedure.
For each of the O(n4) possible 2 × 2 supports, we solve the LPs to find a
WSNE. Proposition 3 implies that this WSNE is at least as good as the
best WSNE on those supports. Let m be the best approximation guarantee
that is found by this procedure.
– Procedure 3: find an improvement over the KS algorithm. The
KS algorithm finds an exact Nash equilibrium (x,y) of the zero-sum game
(D,−D), where D = 12 (R−C). To find an improvement over the KS algo-
rithm we use the linear programs from Definitions 1 and 2 with parameters
Sr = Supp(x) and Sc = Supp(y). Let (x
∗,y∗) be the mixed strategy profile
returned by the LPs, and let i be the smallest value such that (x
∗,y∗) is
a i-WSNE.
Note that one could replace Procedures 1 and 2 with a single procedure that
searches for the best WSNE on supports of size up to 2. However, since Pro-
cedures 1 and 2 play different roles in our proof, we have chosen to keep them
separate here.
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After executing these three procedures, we take the smallest of p, m, and
i, and return the corresponding WSNE. Since all three procedures can be
implemented in polynomial time, this is a polynomial time algorithm. The
rest of this paper is dedicated to proving the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Our algorithm finds a ( 23 − 0.005913759)-WSNE.
5 Proof Outline
In order for our proof to be as informative as possible, we will parameterize it
using a constant z > 0. We will show the conditions under which our algorithm
can produce a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. At the end of the proof we will show that
these conditions are satisfied for z = 0.005913759, which provides a proof of
Theorem 4.
Our approach is to assume that Procedures 1 and 2 did not produce a
( 23 − z)-WSNE, and then to use that assumption to determine the conditions
under which Procedure 3 does find a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. This comprises of the
following steps.
– Reanalyze the KS algorithm. The original analysis for the KS algo-
rithm assumed that the game does not have a pure 23 -WSNE. However, in
our analysis, we have assumed only that Procedure 1 did not find a pure
( 23 − z)-WSNE, so the original KS analysis is no longer valid. In Section 6
we show that, assuming there is no pure ( 23 − z)-WSNE, the KS algorithm
will produce a strategy profile (x,y) where all strategies have payoff at
most 23 + 2z, and therefore (x,y) is a (
2
3 + 2z)-WSNE.
– Study the bad strategies. Our goal is to show that (x,y) can be im-
proved from a ( 23 + 2z)-WSNE to a (
2
3 − z)-WSNE. To achieve this, we
show how to reduce the payoffs of all strategies from 23 +2z to
2
3 −z. While
describing our approach, we will focus on the row player, but all of our
techniques will actually be applied to both players. We define a bad row to
be a row that has payoff strictly more than 23 − z. In Section 7 we study
the properties of bad rows, and we prove that all bad rows are similar in
structure to the games shown in Figures 1 and 2. That is, most of the
columns in a bad row are either big (ie. close to 1,) or small (ie. close to
1
3 .) We prove lower bounds on the amount of probability that the column
player’s strategy assigns to big and small payoffs. We then define a new
strategy for the column player yimp, that finds the worst bad row ı¯ (ie. the
row with the largest payoff,) and shifts all probability from the big columns
in ı¯ to the small columns in ı¯.
– Apply the matching pennies argument. In Section 8 we use the fact
that Procedure 2 did not find an -WSNE on a 2 × 2 support with  <
2
3 − z. Intuitively, this corresponds to ruling out cases like the one shown
in Figure 2. We prove that, if Procedure 2 failed to find a ( 23 − z)-WSNE,
then the bad rows cannot be arranged like they are in Figure 2. This gives
a formal condition on how the probability of y can be distributed over the
columns of the bad rows, which will be used later in the proof.
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– Find an improved strategy. Since the strategy shifts all probability
from big payoffs in row ı¯ to small payoffs in row ı¯, by definition, we must
have that the payoff of ı¯ against yimp is small. However, the payoff of other
rows may increase as we move from y and yimp. We must find a trade-off
between the bad rows decreasing in payoff, and other rows increasing in
payoff, so we define a strategy y(t) = (1 − t) · y + t · yimp, which mixes
between y and yimp. We show that there exists a t such that all rows i
have payoff less than or equal to 23−z against y(t). In Section 9 we develop
a computer-assisted proof for this task. For each z and t we formulate a
linear program that gives the largest possible payoff of a row against y(t),
and then we perform a grid search over z and t in order to find a strategy
y(t) against which all rows have payoff at most 23 − z. Ultimately, we find
that this occurs for z = 0.005913759, which proves Theorem 4.
Before we continue with the proof, we justify why it is possible to treat the
two players independently in our analysis. In our proof, we will start with a
strategy profile (x,y). At a high level, the idea is to rearrange the probabilities
in x to create x′ such that the column player is happier when he plays y
against x′. Simultaneously, we rearrange the probabilities in y to create y′
such that the row player is happier when he plays x against y′. We then claim
that both players are happier in the profile (x′,y′). To see why, observe that
an approximate well supported Nash equilibrium is defined entirely by the
supports that the strategies use. Since we only rearrange probabilities, ie. we
have Supp(x′) ⊆ Supp(x) and Supp(y′) ⊆ Supp(y), it is sufficient to consider
only x′ played against y and y′ played against x in order to prove properties
of (x′,y′).
6 Reanalyzing the KS algorithm
In this section we analyse the KS algorithm under the assumption that Proce-
dure 1 did not find a ( 23−z)-WSNE. Note that if there is a pure strategy profile
(i, j), such that Ri,j ≥ 13 + z and Ci,j ≥ 13 + z, then (i, j) is a ( 23 − z)-WSNE.
Therefore, our assumption allows us to conclude that for all i and j we have:
0 ≤ Ri,j + Ci,j ≤ 4
3
+ z. (3)
This inequality replaces the inequality 0 ≤ Ri,j +Ci,j ≤ 43 , which was used in
the original analysis.
From now on, our analysis will be stated for the row player, with the un-
derstanding that all of our proofs can be apply symmetrically to the column
player. Our goal is to show that all “worst-case” examples for the KS algo-
rithm are similar to Figures 1 and 2. More precisely, if (x,y) is the strategy
profile returned by the KS algorithm, then we are interested in the following
properties of Figures 1 and 2:
– There exists a row i ∈ Supp(x) such that Ri · y = 0 and Ci · y = 0.
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– Every row i with Ri · y = 23 also has Ci · y = 23 .
We will show that our “worst-case” examples have similar properties.
We begin with the first property. Here we show that, if (x,y) is not a
( 23 −z)-WSNE, then there exists a row in the row player’s support where both
players have payoff close to 0.
Proposition 5 If (x,y) is a solution of (D,−D) such that there is an i ∈
Supp(x) where i is not a ( 23 − z)-best response against y in (R,C), then there
is a row i ∈ Supp(x) such that both of the following hold:
Ri · y < 3z, Ci · y < 3z.
Proof We begin by noting that, since D = 12 (R−C), if X = − 12 (R+C), then
we have two equalities:
R = D −X, C = −D −X.
Since x is a min-max strategy in (D,−D), if i is a row in Supp(x), then for
all rows i′ we have:
Di · y ≥ Di′ · y,
(R+X)i · y ≥ (R+X)i′ · y,
Ri · y ≥ Ri′ · y − (Xi −Xi′) · y.
Let i ∈ Supp(x) be a row that is not a ( 23 − z)-best response against y,
which exists by assumption, and let i′ be a best-response against y. We have:
Ri′ · y − (2
3
− z) > Ri · y,
≥ Ri′ · y − (Xi −Xi′) · y.
Hence, we have:
(Xi −Xi′) · y > (2
3
− z).
Note that, by Equation (3), all entries of X must lie in the range [− 23 − 12z, 0].
In particular, this implies that:
−2
3
− 1
2
z ≤ Xi′ · y < Xi · y − (2
3
− z).
This implies that − 32z < Xi ·y ≤ 0. Now, using the definition of X we obtain:
−1
2
(R+ C)i · y > −3
2
z,
which is equivalent to:
(R+ C)i · y < 3z.
Since both R and C are non-negative, we have completed the proof.
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We now consider the second property. Here we show that, if (x,y) is not
a ( 23 − z)-WSNE, then every row has payoff at most 23 + 2z, and that for all
rows i we have that Ri · y − Ci · y is small.
Proposition 6 If (x,y) is a solution of (D,−D) such that there is an i ∈
Supp(x) where i is not a ( 23 − z)-best response against y in (R,C), then for
all rows i′ both of the following hold:
Ri′ · y ≤ 2
3
+ 2z, Ri′ · y − Ci′ · y ≤ 3z.
Proof Let i be the row in Supp(x) whose existence is implied by Proposition 5.
This proposition, along with the fact that all entries in R and C are non-
negative, implies that:
0 ≤ Ri · y < 3z, 0 ≤ Ci · y < 3z.
By definition we have D = 12 (R− C), and therefore, we have:
−3
2
z < Di · y < 3
2
z.
Now, since x is a min-max strategy for the zero-sum game (D,−D), we
must have, for all rows i′:
Di′ · y ≤ Di · y < 3
2
z.
Thus, we have:
1
2
(Ri′ − Ci′) · y < 3
2
z.
Rearranging this yields one of our two conclusions:
Ri′ · y < Ci′ · y + 3z. (4)
We can obtain the other conclusion by rearranging Equation (3), to argue
that for all rows i and all columns j we have:
Ci,j ≤ 4
3
+ z −Ri,j .
Then, Equation (4) implies that:
Ri′ · y < Ci′ · y + 3z ≤ 4
3
+ 4z −Ri′ · y.
This implies that 2 ·Ri′ · y ≤ 43 + 4z, and so we have Ri′ · y ≤ 23 + 2z.
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Proposition 6 shows that Ri′ · y ≤ 23 + 2z holds for all rows i′. Using the
same argument symmetrically, we can also show that Cj′ · x ≤ 23 + 2z for
all columns j′. Thus, we have shown that if there is no pure ( 23 − z)-WSNE,
then the KS algorithm will produce a mixed strategy pair (x,y) that is a
( 23 + 2z)-WSNE.
The main goal of our proof is to show that the probabilities in x and y
can be rearranged to construct a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. From this point onwards, we
only focus on improving the strategy y, with the understanding that all of our
techniques can be applied in the same way to improve the strategy x. For the
rest of the paper, we will fix (x,y) to be the strategy profile produced by the
KS algorithm, and we will assume that it is not a ( 23 − z)-WSNE.
7 Bad Rows
In order to transform (x,y) to a ( 23 − z)-WSNE, we will ensure that there are
no rows with payoff greater than 23 − z. Thus, we define a bad row to be a
row i whose payoff lies in the range 23 − z < Ri · y ≤ 23 + 2z. Furthermore, we
classify the bad rows according to how bad they are.
Definition 7 A row i is q-bad if Ri · y = 23 + 2z − qz.
Since (x,y) is a ( 23 + 2z)-WSNE, we have that every row is q-bad for some
q ≥ 0. Moreover, we are interested in improving the q-bad rows with 0 ≤ q < 3.
In this section, we study the properties of q-bad rows, and we show that they
must look similar to the bad rows in Figures 1 and 2.
To begin, we observe that if i is a q-bad row, then we can apply the second
inequality of Proposition 6 to obtain:
Ci · y ≥ 2
3
− z − qz. (5)
Now consider a q-bad row i with q < 3. We can deduce the following three
properties about row i.
– Definition 7 tells us that Ri · y is close to 23 .
– Equation (5) tells us that Ci · y is close to 23 .
– The fact that there are no pure ( 23 − z)-WSNEs implies that, for each
column j, we must either have Ri,j <
1
3 + z or Ci,j <
1
3 + z, because
otherwise (i, j) would be a pure (23 − z)-WSNE.
In order to satisfy all three of these conditions simultaneously, the row i must
have a very particular form: approximately half of the probability assigned
by y must be given to columns j where Ri,j is close to 1 and Ci,j is close
to 13 , and approximately half of the probability assigned by y must be given
to columns j where Ri,j is close to
1
3 and Ci,j is close to 1.
Building on this observation, we split the columns of each row i into three
sets. We define the set Bi of big columns to be Bi = {j : Ri,j ≥ 23 + 2z},
and the set Si of small columns to be Si = {j : Ci,j ≥ 23 + 2z}. Finally, we
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have the set of other columns Oi = {1, 2, . . . , n} \ (Bi ∪Si), which contains all
columns that are neither big nor small.
We now formalise our observations by giving inequalities about the amount
of probability that y can assign to Bi, Si, and Oi, for every q-bad row i. The
following proposition proves three inequalities. The first inequality is proved
using Markov’s inequality. The second and third inequalities arise from sub-
stituting the first inequality into Definition 7 and Equation (5), respectively.
The full proof of this proposition is presented in A.
Proposition 8 If i is a q-bad row then:∑
j∈Oi
yj ≤ 2qz1
3 − 2z
,
∑
j∈Bi
yj ≥
1
3 + z − qz − ( 13 + z)
∑
j∈Oi yj
2
3 − z
,
∑
j∈Si
yj ≥
1
3 − 2z − qz − ( 13 + z)
∑
j∈Oi yj
2
3 − z
.
The strategies yimp and y(t) We now define our improved strategies. Let
ı¯ to be a worst bad row. That is ı¯ is a row that satisfies arg maxi(Ri · y), and
therefore ı¯ is a q¯-bad row such that there is no q-bad row with q < q¯. We fix ı¯
and q¯ to be these choices for the rest of this paper. Note that we can assume
that q¯ < 3, because if this is not the case, then all rows have payoff less than
or equal to 23 − z, and y does not need to be improved.
We begin by defining a strategy that improves row ı¯. We will improve
row ı¯ by moving the probability assigned to Bı¯ to Sı¯. Formally, we define the
strategy yimp as follows. For each j with 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have:
yimpj =

0 if j ∈ Bı¯,
yj +
yj ·
∑
k∈Bı¯ yk∑
k∈Sı¯ yk
if j ∈ Sı¯,
yj otherwise.
(6)
The strategy yimp improves the specific bad row ı¯, but other rows may not
improve, or even get worse in yimp. Therefore, we will study convex combina-
tions of y and yimp. More formally, for the parameter t ∈ [0, 1], we define the
strategy y(t) to be (1− t) · y + t · yimp.
8 Applying the matching pennies argument
So far, we have not used the assumption that Procedure 2 did not find a
( 23 − z)-WSNE. In this section we will see how this assumption can be used to
prove properties about the q-bad rows. We begin by defining the concept of a
matching pennies sub-game.
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Definition 9 (Matching Pennies) Let y be a column player strategy, let
i and i′ be two rows, and let j and j′ be two columns. If j ∈ Bi ∩ Si′ and
j′ ∈ Bi′∩Si, then we say that i, i′, j, and j′ form a matching pennies sub-game
in y.
An example of a matching pennies sub-game is given by l, r, T , and M in
Figure 2, because we have l ∈ BM ∩ ST , and we have r ∈ BT ∩ SM . In
this example, we can obtain an exact Nash equilibrium by making the row
player mix uniformly between T and M , and making the column player mix
uniformly between l and r. However, in general we can only expect to obtain
an ( 23 − z)-WSNE using this technique, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 10 Let y be a column player strategy. If there is a matching
pennies sub-game in y, then we can construct a ( 23 − z)-WSNE with a 2 × 2
support.
Proof Let i, i′, j, and j′ be a matching pennies sub-game in y. We define two
strategies x′ and y′ as follows:
x′k =
{
0.5 if k = i or k = i′,
0 otherwise.
y′k =
{
0.5 if k = j or k = j′,
0 otherwise.
We will prove that (x′,y′) is a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. Note that when the column
player plays y′, the payoff to the row player from row i is:
Ri · y′ = 0.5 ·Ri,j + 0.5 ·Ri,j′ .
Since j ∈ Bi we have Ri,j ≥ 23 + 2z, Hence, we have:
Ri · y′ ≥ 0.5×
(
2
3
+ 2z
)
+ 0.5× 0 = 1
3
+ z.
An identical argument can be used to argue that Ri′ ·y′, CT j ·x′, and CT j′ ·x′
are all greater than or equal to 13 + z.
Thus, we have shown that all pure strategies in the support of x′ and y′
are ( 23 − z)-best responses. Hence, (x′,y′) is a ( 23 − z)-WSNE.
Proposition 10 allows us to assume that the game does not contain a match-
ing pennies sub-game, because otherwise Procedure 2 would have found a
( 23−z)-WSNE. Note that, by definition, if the game does not contain a match-
ing pennies sub-game, then for all rows i we must have either Bı¯ ∩ Si = ∅, or
Bi ∩ Sı¯ = ∅.
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9 An Improved Strategy Exists
Our goal is to show that there exists a t in the range 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 and a z > 0
such that for every row i, we have Ri ·y(t) ≤ 23 −z. In this section, we develop
a computer-assisted proof of this fact.
Recall that the strategy yimp is defined by moving all probability from
the columns in Bı¯ to the columns in Sı¯. We are interested in how other rows
i are affected by this operation. This will depend on how much probability
mass is shared between the partition (Bi, Si, Oi), and the partition (Bı¯, Sı¯, Oı¯).
Figure 3 shows the nine possible intersections.
Row i
Row ı¯ Bı¯ Sı¯ Oı¯
Bi Bi BiSi Si SiOi Oi Oi
Fig. 3: The nine possible intersections between the partition (Bı¯, Sı¯, Oı¯), and
the partition (Bi, Si, Oi) for the rows i and ı¯.
We are interested in the amount of probability that y assigns to each of
these nine sets. We define a shorthand for this purpose:
bb =
∑
j∈Bı¯∩Bi
yj , sb =
∑
j∈Sı¯∩Bi
yj , ob =
∑
j∈Oı¯∩Bi
yj ,
bs =
∑
j∈Bı¯∩Si
yj , ss =
∑
j∈Sı¯∩Si
yj , os =
∑
j∈Oı¯∩Si
yj ,
bo =
∑
j∈Bı¯∩Oi
yj , so =
∑
j∈Sı¯∩Oi
yj , oo =
∑
j∈Oı¯∩Oi
yj .
As t is increased away from 0, probability will be shifted from bb, bs, and bo
to sb, ss, and so, while the amount of probability assigned to ob, os, and oo
will remain constant.
For each fixed t in the range 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and each fixed z > 0, we are
interested in the worst-case value of Ri · y(t). We will show that an upper
bound on Ri · y(t) can be obtained by solving a linear program. The linear
program has eleven variables. We use nine variables, bb, bs, bo, sb, ss, so,
ob, os, and oo, to represent the amount of probability assigned to the columns
in i. We use two additional variables q and q¯ to represent how bad the rows
ı¯ and i are. These two variables should be interpreted as follows: row ı¯ is a
q¯-bad row and row i is a q-bad row.
We can now define the linear program. We begin by defining a helper
function φ(z, q¯) as follows:
φ(z, q¯) = 1 +
1
3 + z + q¯z
1
3 − 2z − q¯z − ( 13 + z) · 2q¯z1
3−2z
.
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Maximize:
(1− t)
(
2
3
+ 2z − q · z
)
+ t ·
(
φ(z, 3)
(
sb + (
1
3
+ z) · ss + ( 2
3
+ 2z) · so
)
+ ob + (
1
3
+ z) · os + ( 2
3
+ 2z) · oo
)
Subject to:
bb + bs + bo ≥
1
3
+ z − q¯ · z − ( 1
3
+ z)(ob + os + oo)
2
3
− z (7)
bb + sb + ob ≥
1
3
+ z − q · z − ( 1
3
+ z)(bo + so + oo)
2
3
− z (8)
sb + ss + so ≥
1
3
− 2z − q¯ · z − ( 1
3
+ z)(ob + os + oo)
2
3
− z (9)
bs + ss + os ≥
1
3
− 2z − q · z − ( 1
3
+ z)(bo + so + oo)
2
3
− z (10)
ob + os + oo ≤ 2 · q¯ · z
1
3
− 2z (11)
bo + so + oo ≤ 2 · q · z
1
3
− 2z (12)
0 =
{
bs if k = 0
sb if k = 1
(13)
q¯ ≤ 3 (14)
q¯ ≤ q (15)
1 = bb + bs + bo + sb + ss + so + ob + os + oo (16)
0 ≤ bb,bs,bo, sb, ss, so,ob,os,oo,q, q¯ (17)
Fig. 4: The linear program LP (z, t, k).
Our linear program will be parameterised: for each z with z ≥ 0, each t in the
range 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, and each k ∈ {0, 1} we define LP (z, t, k) to be the linear
program shown in Figure 4. The rest of this section is dedicated to showing
that this linear program can be used to find an upper bound on Ri · y(t), for
all rows i.
The Constraints We begin by arguing that all of the constraints in the LP
are valid. Firstly, since z and t are both constants, it can be seen that all of the
constraints are indeed linear. Constraints (7) through (12) are taken directly
from Proposition 8. Each inequality in Proposition 8 appears twice: once for
the row i and once for the row ı¯.
Constraint (13) encodes the matching pennies argument. By Proposition 10
if we have both bs > 0 and sb > 0, then we can find a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. Thus,
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we can assume that either sb = 0 or sb = 0. Constraint (13) encodes this
using the parameter k: if k = 0 then bs is constrained to be 0, and if k = 1,
then sb is constrained to be 0.
Constraints (14) and (15) provide bounds for q and q¯. Recall that a row
i is q-bad if Ri · y = 23 + 2z − qz. Since q¯ is the q-value for a worst bad row,
and since a worst bad row ı¯ must have Rı¯ · y ≥ 23 − z, we must have q¯ ≤ 3.
This is encoded in Constraint (14). Constraint (15) again uses the fact that
q¯ is the q-value of a worst bad row: the q value for every other row must be
greater than or equal to q¯.
Finally, Constraints (16) and (17) specify that the nine variables must be
a probability distribution. They also specify that both q and q¯ must be non-
negative, which is valid because Proposition 6 implies that no row i can have
Ri · y > 23 + 2z.
The Objective We now show that the objective function of the linear pro-
gram provides an upper bound on Ri ·y(t). To prove this, we first observe that
by definition we have
Ri · y(t) = (1− t) ·Ri · y + t ·Ri · yimp. (18)
Since i is a q-bad row, we have that Ri · y = 23 + 2z − qz. In the following
proposition, we show an upper bound for Ri · yimp.
Proposition 11 We have that Ri · yimp is less than or equal to:(
1 +
bb + bs + bo
sb + ss + so
)(
sb + (
1
3
+ z) · ss + (2
3
+ 2z) · so
)
+ ob + (
1
3
+ z) · os + (2
3
+ 2z) · oo.
Proof Since yimp is obtained from y by shifting all probability from Bı¯ to Sı¯,
we have that:
Ri · yimp =
∑
j∈Sı¯
Ri,j · yimp +
∑
j∈Oı¯
Ri,j · yimp
=
∑
j∈Sı¯
Ri,j · yimp +
∑
j∈Oı¯
Ri,j · y
=
(
1 +
bb + bs + bo
sb + ss + so
)∑
j∈Sı¯
Ri,j · y +
∑
j∈Oı¯
Ri,j · y. (19)
The second and third equalities were obtained directly from the definition of
yimp given in (6).
Now to obtain the claimed result we split the two sums into their con-
stituent parts. Firstly, we have that
∑
j∈Sı¯ y = sb + ss + so, and by definition
we have that:
– Ri,j ≤ 1 for each j ∈ Bi,
– Ri,j ≤ 13 + z for each j ∈ Si, and
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– Ri,j ≤ 23 + 2z for each j ∈ Oi.
Similarly, we split the sum
∑
j∈Oı¯ y into ob + os + oo, and apply the same
bounds as above. Combining all of these bounds and substituting them into
Equation (19) yields the claimed result.
Substituting our two bounds into Equation (18) does give an upper bound
on Ri · y(t), but this upper bound is not linear in the variables of the linear
program. To resolve this, in the next proposition we provide a constant upper
bound for one of the terms in the LP, using the auxiliary function φ(z, q¯) that
was defined earlier.
Proposition 12 If z < 13−3
√
17
24 ≈ 0.02627, then(
1 +
bb + bs + bo
sb + ss + so
)
≤ φ(z, 3).
Proof Proposition 8 implies that sb+ss+so ≥ 13−2z−q¯z−( 13 +z)(ob+os+oo)2
3−z
. We
can apply this in order to determine the following upper bound for bb+bs+bo.
bb + bs + bo = 1− (sb + ss + so)− (ob + os + oo)
≤ 1−
1
3 − 2z − q¯z − ( 13 + z)(ob + os + oo)
2
3 − z
− (ob + os + oo)
= 1−
1
3 − 2z − q¯z + (− 13 − z + 23 − z)(ob + os + oo)
2
3 − z
= 1−
1
3 − 2z − q¯z + ( 13 − 2z)(ob + os + oo)
2
3 − z
=
1
3 + z + q¯z − ( 13 − 2z)(ob + os + oo)
2
3 − z
≤
1
3 + z + q¯z
2
3 − z
.
Substituting this gives the following upper bound.(
1 +
bb + bs + bo
sb + ss + so
)
≤
(
1 +
1
3 + z + q¯z
( 23 − z) · (sb + ss + so)
)
. (20)
In order to proceed we must now use a lower bound for ( 23 −z) · (sb+ss+so).
By Proposition 8 we have that:
(
2
3
− z) · (sb + ss + so) ≥ 1
3
− 2z − q¯z − (1
3
+ z)(ob + os + oo)
≥ 1
3
− 2z − q¯z − (1
3
+ z) · 2q¯z1
3 − 2z
. (21)
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In order to substitute Inequality (21) into Inequality (20), we must have that
2z + q¯z + ( 13 + z) · 2q¯z1
3−2z
< 13 , because otherwise the denominator of Inequal-
ity (20) will be 0 or negative. Since q¯ can be at most 3, this holds whenever:
5z + (
1
3
+ z) · 6z1
3 − 2z
<
1
3
.
Solving this inequality for z gives that z < 13±3
√
17
24 . Taking the smaller of the
two solutions gives z < 13−3
√
17
24 ≈ 0.02627.
So, if we have z < 13−3
√
17
24 , then we can conclude:(
1 +
bb + bs + bo
sb + ss + so
)
≤
(
1 +
1
3 + z + q¯z
1
3 − 2z − q¯z − ( 13 + z) · 2q¯z1
3−2z
)
= φ(z, q¯).
To complete the proof we observe that, so long as 0 ≤ z < 13−3
√
17
24 , we have
that φ(z, q¯) is monotonically increasing in q¯. This holds because q¯ only occurs
positively in the numerator and negatively in the denominator, and because
the denominator is strictly positive. Thus, since q¯ can be at most 3, we have
φ(z, q¯) ≤ φ(z, 3).
Combining the upper bound from Proposition 12 with the upper bound
from Proposition 11, and substituting the result into Equation (18) gives a
linear upper bound on Ri ·y(t), and this linear bound is used as the objective
function of the LP.
The Upper Bound We can now prove that the linear program provides an
upper bound on the quality of WSNE provided by y(t). For each problem
LP (z, t, k), let Sol(LP (z, t, k)) be the value of the objective function in the
solution of LP (z, t, k).
Proposition 13 For every z > 0 and t in the range 0 ≤ t ≤ 1:
– if
∑
j∈Bı¯∩Si y = 0 then Ri · y(t) ≤ Sol(LP (z, t, 0)).
– if
∑
j∈Sı¯∩Bi y = 0 then Ri · y(t) ≤ Sol(LP (z, t, 1)).
Proof We will prove only the case where
∑
j∈Bı¯∩Si y = 0, because the other
case is entirely symmetric. Let i be a row that maximizes Ri · y(t), and let
ı¯ be the worst bad row in y. It is not difficult to construct a feasible point
in LP (z, t, 0) that represents these two rows: the variables bb,bs, . . . are set
according to the probability assigned to the corresponding intersection sets by
y, while q and q¯ are set to be the q-values of i and ı¯, respectively.
Obviously, this point satisfies q¯ ≤ 3 and q¯ ≤ 3, and it also satisfies the
non-negativities and the sum-to-one constraint. Furthermore, by assumption
we have that bs = 0, so Constraint (13) is satisfied. Since all other constraints
of the LP were derived from the properties of either q-bad or q¯-bad rows, we
have that the point is feasible in LP (z, t, 0).
19
Since Propositions 11 and 12 show that the objective function of the LP
provides an upper bound on Ri · y(y), and since the LP is a maximization
problem, we must have Ri · y(t) ≤ Sol(LP (z, t, 0)).
Finding z We now describe how the linear programs can be used to determine
a value of z such that y(t) is a ( 23 − z)-WSNE. For every z > 0, if we want
to prove that we can produce a ( 23 − z)-WSNE, we require a witness (z, t0, t1)
that satisfies both of the following conditions:
– We have that t0 is in the range 0 ≤ t0 ≤ 1 and that Sol(z, t0, 0) ≤ 23 − z.
– We have that t1 is in the range 0 ≤ t1 ≤ 1 and that Sol(z, t1, 1) ≤ 23 − z.
If a pair (t0, t1) can be found that satisfy these properties, then y(t0) is a
( 23 − z)-WSNE in the case where bs = 0, and y(t1) is a ( 23 − z)-WSNE in the
case where sb = 0.
Our strategy for finding a witness (z, t0, t1) was to perform a grid search
over all possible values for z, t0, and t1 using a suitably small increment.
We implemented this approach in Mathematica2, where for each candidate
witness, we solved the two linear programs in exact arithmetic. Ultimately,
we were able to find a witness (0.005913759, 0.120, 0.168), and we were unable
to find a witness for z = 0.005913760. Thus, we have completed the proof of
Theorem 4.
10 Conclusion
We have shown that our algorithm always finds a ( 23 − 0.005913759)-WSNE.
Our computer assisted proof relied upon a linear program. We tried several
ways to improve this analysis, all of which were ultimately unsuccessful.
The current proof finds two values of t: one for the case where bb = 0,
and one for the case where sb = 0. One obvious approach towards improving
the analysis is to split the analysis into more cases, and compute a t for each
case. One of our unsuccessful attempts in this direction was to parameterise
the LP for different values of q¯. The existing LP allows q¯ to take any value
in the range [0, 3], but we could, for example, use one LP for the case where
q¯ ∈ [0, 1.5] and another for the case where q¯ ∈ [1.5, 3], and then compute two
different values of t for these two cases. Unfortunately, this did not yield a
better analysis no matter how many different bands we used.
The objective function of the LP uses a linear upper bound on the non-
linear expression from Proposition 11. We could, in principle, attempt to solve
the non-linear optimization problem that is obtained when the expression from
Proposition 11 is used directly as the objective function. Unfortunately, it
seems that this task is beyond current technology. In particular, the need
to solve the problem in exact arithmetic thwarted our attempts to solve the
problem within a reasonable running time.
2 Our code is available in the appendix of the arXiv version of this paper, which is available
at http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0707.
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A Proof of Proposition 8
We begin by proving the inequality for Oi. The first thing that we note is that, if a column
j is in Oi, then Ri,j + Ci,j must be significantly smaller than
4
3
+ z.
Proposition 14 For each row i, and each column j ∈ Oi, we have Ri,j + Ci,j < 1 + 3z.
Proof For each column j ∈ Oi we have both of the following properties:
– Since j /∈ Bi, we have Ri,j < 23 + 2z.
– Since j /∈ Si, we have Ci,j < 23 + 2z.
Furthermore, our assumption that Procedure (1) does not find a pure ( 2
3
−z)-WSNE implies
that:
– If Ri,j ≥ 13 + z, then Ci,j < 13 + z.
– If Ci,j ≥ 13 + z, then Ri,j < 13 + z.
This is because, if these inequalities did not hold for some pair i and j, then it is easy to
show that (i, j) is a ( 2
3
−z)-WSNE. From these properties it is easy to see that Ri,j +Ci,j <
2
3
+ 2z + 1
3
+ z = 1 + 3z.
We now use this proposition, along with Markov’s inequality, to prove the bound for Oi
specified in Proposition 8.
Proposition 15 If i is a q-bad row, then
∑
j∈Oi yj ≤
2qz
1
3
−2z .
Proof Consider the random variable T = 4
3
+ z − Ri,j − Ci,j , where i is fixed and j is
sampled from y. From Equation (3), we have that T takes values in the range [0, 4
3
+ z].
Utilizing Definition 7 along with Equation (5) gives the following:
Riy + Ciy ≥ 4
3
+ (1− 2q)z.
Therefore, we have the following expression for the expectation of T :
E[T ] =
4
3
+ z − Ej∼y[Ri,j + Ci,j ]
≤ 4
3
+ z −
(
4
3
+ (1− 2q)z
)
= 2qz
By Proposition 14, for each j ∈ Oi, we have Ri,j + Ci,j ≤ 1 + 3z. Hence, we have T ≥
4
3
+z−(1+3z) = 1
3
−2z for each j ∈ Oi. Therefore, we must have Pr(T ≥ 13−2z) ≥
∑
j∈Oi yj .
Applying Markov’s inequality completes the proof:
Pr(T ≥ 1
3
− 2z) ≤ E[T ]
1
3
− 2z ≤
2qz
1
3
− 2z .
Now we prove the inequality that was given for Bi in Proposition 8.
Proposition 16 If i is a q-bad row, then
∑
j∈Bi yj ≥
1
3
+z−qz−( 1
3
+z)
∑
j∈Oi yj
2
3
−z .
Proof Since the sets Bi, Si, and Oi are disjoint, we can write Definition 7 as:∑
j∈Bi
yjRi,j +
∑
j∈Si
yjRi,j +
∑
j∈Oi
yjRi,j ≥ 2
3
+ 2z − qz.
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We know that Ri,j ≤ 1 for each j ∈ Bi, that Ri,j ≤ 23 + 2z for each j ∈ Oi, and that
Ri,j ≤ 13 + z for each j ∈ Si. Therefore we obtain the following inequality:
1 ·
∑
j∈Bi
yj +
(
1
3
+ z
)
·
∑
j∈Si
yj +
(
2
3
+ 2z
)
·
∑
j∈Oi
yj ≥ 2
3
+ 2z − qz.
Furthermore, since
∑
j∈Si yj = 1−
∑
j∈Bi yj −
∑
j∈Oi yj , we have:
∑
j∈Bi
yj +
(
1
3
+ z
)
·
1− ∑
j∈Bi
yj −
∑
j∈Oi
yj
+ (2
3
+ 2z
) ∑
j∈Oi
yj ≥ 2
3
+ 2z − qz.
Rearranging this gives:(
2
3
− z
)
·
∑
j∈Bi
yj ≥ 1
3
+ z − qz −
(
1
3
+ z
) ∑
j∈Oi
yj .
Finally, this allows us to conclude that:
∑
j∈Bi
yj ≥
1
3
+ z − qz − ( 1
3
+ z)
∑
j∈Oi yj
2
3
− z .
Finally, we prove the inequality that was given for Sj in Proposition 8. This proof is
very similar to the proof of Proposition 16, except that we substitute into Equation (5)
rather than Definition 7.
Proposition 17 If i is a q-bad row then
∑
j∈Si yj ≥
1
3
−2z−qz−( 1
3
+z)
∑
j∈Oi yj
2
3
−z .
Proof Since the sets Bi, Si, and Oi are disjoint, we can rewrite Equation (5) as:∑
j∈Bi
yjCi,j +
∑
j∈Si
yjCi,j +
∑
j∈Oi
yjCi,j ≥ 2
3
− z − qz.
We know that Ci,j ≤ 1 for each j ∈ Si, that Ci,j ≤ 23 + 2z for each j ∈ Oi, and that
Ci,j ≤ 13 + z for each j ∈ Bi. Therefore we obtain the following inequality:
1 ·
∑
j∈Si
yj +
(
1
3
+ z
)
·
∑
j∈Bi
yj +
(
2
3
+ 2z
)
·
∑
j∈Oi
yj ≥ 2
3
− z − qz.
Furthermore, since
∑
j∈Bi yj = 1−
∑
j∈Si yj −
∑
j∈Oi yj , we have:
∑
j∈Si
yj +
(
1
3
+ z
)
·
1− ∑
j∈Si
yj −
∑
j∈Oi
yj
+ (2
3
+ 2z
) ∑
j∈Oi
yj ≥ 2
3
− z − qz.
Rearranging this gives:(
2
3
− z
)
·
∑
j∈Si
yj ≥ 1
3
− 2z − qz −
(
1
3
+ z
) ∑
j∈Oi
yj .
Finally, this allows us to conclude that:
∑
j∈Si
yj ≥
1
3
− 2z − qz − ( 1
3
+ z)
∑
j∈Oi yj
2
3
− z .
Now that we have shown Propositions 15, 16, and 17, we have completed the proof of
Proposition 8
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